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TORTS - CIGARETTE SMOKING - PROXIMATE CAUSE OF
LUNG CANCER
Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Company,
295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir 1961)
Otto Pritchard's right lung became infected with cancer and was re-
moved in 1953. In his suit against Liggett & Myers Tobacco Company,'
he alleged that the cancer was caused by smoking Chesterfields from
1921 to 1953. He further alleged that the tobacco company was liable
for its negligence in manufacturing cigarettes containing carcinogenic 2
ingredients and for its failure to warn consumers of the presence of those
ingredients. He also claimed Liggett & Myers was liable for the breach
of both express3 and implied warranties.
On the defendant's motions, the district court dismissed the warranty
counts on the ground that Pritchard's notice of the breach was neither
timely nor sufficient as a matter of law, and it directed a verdict for the
defendant on the ground that there was no substantial evidence to support
a verdict on a negligence theory.4 The court of appeals reversed and re-
manded the case for a new trial, holding there was sufficient evidence to
warrant a jury finding on the following questions: the causal relation be-
tween the smoking and the cancer, the alleged negligence of the defend-
ant, and the alleged breaches of warranties.'
Certainly, causation is the crucial issue in a case of this type. In
Pritchard v Liggett & Myers Tobacco Company five doctors, cancer ex-
perts, testified that in their opinion the lung cancer was caused by smok-
ing cigarettes. The defendant contended that this testimony was insuffi-
cient as a matter of law to establish a causal relationship in the absence
1. Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 134 F. Supp. 829 (W.D. Pa. 1955)
2. "Carcinogenic" is defined as causing cancer. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 263
(1961) "It has long been established that prolonged contact with some kinds of extrinsic
irritants produces a marked affinity for certain cancer types." These irritants are called car-
cinogenic agents. Small, Galling at a Thing Called Cause: Medico-Legal Conflicts in the
Concept of Causation, 31 TEXAS L. REv. 630, 634-35 (1953)
3. Pritchard claimed that Liggett & Myers advertisements in newspapers, magazines, radio,
and television from 1934 to 1953 amounted to express assurances that smoking Chesterfields
would have no harmful effect on the lungs. Advertisements in 1952 and 1953 stated, "Nose,
throat and accessory organs not adversely affected by smoking Chesterfields." Pritchard v.
Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292, 297 (3d Cir. 1961).
4. Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., W.D. Pa., May 3, 1960. "In ultimately grant-
ing the motion the district court did not make it clear whether the proof of causation was
insufficient or whether his decision was based solely on plaintiff's failure to prove negligence."
Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292, 296 (3d Cir. 1961).
5. Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961)
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of a general acceptance of such a relationship by the medical profession.6
The court of appeals held that this contention could not be sustained in
the light of its past decisions on this pointT and that, at best, the conten-
tion was one for the jury since it concerned the weight to be given to the
expert opinions.
The validity of the court's ruling on this point seems evident in the
light of decisions in similar suits in other jurisdictions. Although the
tobacco companies have apparently always been successful m these cases8
seemingly recoveries have not been lost because of an inability to estab-
lish a causal relationship between smoking and cancer.'
This judicial refusal to require general medical acceptance is readily
6. There have been several decisions seemingly supporting the defendant's contention, but
the scientific bases for the expert opinions as to the causal relationship in such cases are
much less than the evidence supporting the contention that cigarette smoking causes cancer.
The cases cited by the defendant involved such diseases of unknown origin as leukemia and
mongolism. Brief for Appellee, pp. 47-49. See Sevigny s Case, 337 Mass. 747, 151 N.E.2d
258 (1958); Puhl v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 343, 99 N.W.2d 163 (1959)
7. The court was referring to its decisions in Brett v. J. M. Carras, Incorporated, 203 F.2d
451 (3d Cir. 1953), and in Deitz v. United States, 228 F.2d 494 (3d Cir. 1955). The
former involved a claim that Pager's disease of the plaintiff's skull was caused by trauma, and
the latter, that the plaintiff's eye disease was caused by falling paint. In the Brett case one of
the plaintiffs expert witnesses testified that his opinion was as scientific as one could get about
Paget's disease. The court held in regard to the sufficiency of that testimony to establish
cause: 'That is enough, unless there is a rule that there can be no recovery, based on negli-
gence, for a disease the cause of which is not yet known with absolute certainty to medical
science. Respondents have shown us no such pronouncement, nor have we found any." Brett
v. J. M. Carras, Inc., 203 F.2d 451, 453 (3d Cir. 1953).
8. Cancer and Cigarettes, 7 Current Med., Nov. 1960, p. 8.
9. See Cooper v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 256 F.2d 464 (1st Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 875 (1958); Ross v. Philip Morris Co., 164 F. Supp. 683 (W.D. Mo. 1958);
Green v. American Tobacco Co., unreported case tried in the United States District Court in
Miami, Florida, in August 1960, and discussed in 1 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODucrs LIABIL-
rY 386 (1960-61); and Cancer and Cigarettes, 7 Current Med., Nov. 1960, p. 8. "T]hese
cases are very significant in that for the first time 'reasonable medical certainty' was not re-
quired in the testimony." Ibid. The decisions in these cases are in line with the recent hold-
ing of the United States Supreme Court in Sentilles v. Inter-Carribbean Shipping Corporation,
361 U.S. 107 (1959).
The plaintiff in Sentilles claimed that an injury he had received while a seaman on the
defendant's vessel had activated a previously latent tubercular condition. In reversing a
judgment for the defendant, the Supreme Court held: "The jury's power to draw the inference
that the aggravation of petitioner's tubercular condition was in fact caused by that accident,
was not impaired by the failure of any medical witness to testify that it was in fact the cause.
Neither can it be impaired by the lack of medical unanimity as to the respective likelihood of
the potential causes of the aggravation, or by the fact that other potential causes of the ag-
gravation existed and were not conclusively negated by the proofs." Id. at 109. (Emphasis
added.)
Two other cases involving cigarette smoking as the cause of lung cancer are Mitchell v.
American Tobacco Company, 183 F. Supp. 406 (M.D. Pa. 1960); and Lartique v. Liggett &
Myers and R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Companies, unreported case cited in 2 FRUMER & FRIED-
MiAN, PRODUCrS LiABILry 1388 (1961). For a discussion of possible theories of recovery
for lung cancer in a suit against a cigarette manufacturer, see Brumfield, Liabilities of Tobacco
Industry: Cancer and Its Relationship to Smoking - Is It Actionable, in 1958 BELLI SEM-
INAR, TRIAL AND TORT TRENDS 1 (1959). For an excellent brief discussion of the liability
of tobacco manufacturers and sellers for various injuries including lung cancer, see Annot.,
80 A.L.R.2d 681 (1961).
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explainable by the observation of legal scholars that the doctor's and the
scientist's concept of "cause" is entirely different from the lawyer's con-
ception of that term.'" The doctor requires a high degree of certainty of
zhe existence of a causal relationship between a particular factual situa-
tion and a disease before he will admit the existence of such a relation-
ship. The lawyer, on the other hand, has not required such certainty.
This divergence is apparent in those cases in which trauma was the al-
leged cause of cancer and in other cases in which something other than
cigarette smoking was the alleged cause.
There have been numerous recoveries in such cases even though the
alleged cause of the cancer has been no more conclusively established by
scientific evidence than the contention that cigarette smoking causes can-
cer. In fact, doctors have steadfastly refused to recognize trauma as a
cause of cancer;" yet the recoveries for cancer caused by trauma have
been numerous.' 2 And where the claim has been that the defendant's
act aggravated an existing cancer, there has been an even greater number
of recoveries.'"
Although allowing the jury to decide whether the plaintiff has proven
that his lung cancer was the result of smoking cigarettes opens the door
to possible recoveries against cigarette manufacturers, 4 it is uncertain
what measures these companies will be compelled to take to avoid the
possible adverse results of litigation. However, any measures that might
be taken could, it seems, only be beneficial to the consuming public. But
aside from the effect on the tobacco industry, it must be concluded, in
the light of the cases discussed above, that the court of appeals' decision
in Pritchard v. Ltggett & Myers Tobacco Company is correct. Where
there is reliable medical testimony presented to establish the causal rela-
tion, that issue should be considered by the jury in suits against cigarette
manufacturers, as it has been in similar cases.
ROBERT A. LENGA
10. See Small, Gaffing at a Thing Called Cause: Medico-Legal Conflicts in the Concept
of Causation, 31 TExAS L. REv. 630 (1953); Cancer of the Lung - Breach of Warranty in
Cigarette Sales?, 1 Current Med., Sept. 1954, pp. 35, 38.
11. Small, Gaffing at a Thing Called Cause: Medico-Legal Conflicts in the Concept of
Causation, 31 TExAS L. REV. 630, 636-39 (1953)
12. See, e.g., Lee v. Blessing, 131 Conn. 569, 41 A.2d 337 (1945) (cancer of the breast
caused by injury received in automobile accident); Pittman v. Pillsbury Flour Mills, Inc., 234
Minn. 517, 48 N.W.2d 735 (1951) (cancer of the breast); Menarde v. Philadelphia Transp.
Co., 376 Pa. 497, 103 A.2d 681 (1954) (cancer of the breast resulting from bruise received
when streetcar started forward prematurely) For additional cases, both in tort and in work-
man s compensation, see Small, Gaffing at a Thing Called Cause: Medico-Legal Conflicts in
the Concept of Causation, 31 TEXAS L. REV. 630, 639, 641-44 (1953); 10 NACCA L. J.
65 (1952)
13. Id. at 36. And see, e.g., Scobey v. Southern Lumber Co., 218 Ark. 671, 238 S.W.2d
640 (1951) (lung cancer aggravated by saw filings and emery dust), Hagy v. Allied Chem.
& Dye Corp., 122 Cal. App. 2d 361, 265 P.2d 86 (1953) (lung cancer aggravated by smog)
14. But the difficulties to be overcome before recovery can be had are still great. See, e.g.,
cases cited in note 9 supra.
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